By Dr. Allen Pietrobon
In the aftermath of the U.S. government’s military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, it is easy to assume that Iran and the United States will never come to diplomatic terms over Iran’s nuclear future. President Donald Trump reportedly decided to launch the strikes partly because he had become increasingly frustrated with Iran for not responding to the latest proposal for a nuclear deal.
Iran, for its part, claimed that it would never abandon its right to enrich uranium for domestic purposes. But at least they were still talking. Now, in response to the American military attacks, Iran’s top diplomat has said that the United States had “decided to blow up diplomacy,” and the next scheduled round of nuclear talks was canceled.
The prospect of Iran developing a nuclear weapon is a grave danger that, like other nuclear perils, needs to be taken seriously. But history has shown that even in moments of maximum danger, when the world seems perched on the edge of a wider war, diplomatic solutions are possible.
The parallels to another historical moment are telling. Before the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the U.S. government had been negotiating with the Soviet government for over six years to get a nuclear test ban treaty signed that would put major constraints on the testing and development of nuclear weapons.
When the Missile Crisis began, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev called U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s announcement of a naval blockade (technically, an act of war) “outright banditry . . . the folly of degenerate imperialism.” He declared that “the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States.”
Similarly, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has called the attacks on Iran “barbarous” and claimed that the U.S. government had acted in such a way as to make further nuclear talks “meaningless.”
And yet, back in 1962, the US and Soviet Union, despite being just one mistake or miscalculation away from blundering into a global nuclear war, managed to work together to negotiate a diplomatic end to the crisis. Indeed, the year between the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 and the ratification of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in October 1963 witnessed one of the most unexpected reversals in international conflict during the entire Cold War.
The first overture came on December 19, 1962, when Khrushchev, breaking with years of hardline diplomacy, dispatched a letter to Kennedy offering to move forward with a treaty to ban the testing of nuclear weapons. It was the first direct contact between the two leaders in nearly two months.
Hoping to capitalize on this positive diplomatic opening, Kennedy chose an unorthodox route. Instead of turning to his professional diplomats, bound by protocol and official talking points, he chose to dispatch a private citizen, the prominent journalist Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, to personally meet with Khrushchev and help clear up the remaining obstacles to a settlement.
During this meeting, Khrushchev explained to Cousins that he was encountering fierce opposition from within his own government in his pursuit of the test ban and that what he needed from Kennedy was a sign that the U.S. government was serious about negotiating in good faith.
Back in the United States, Cousins convinced Kennedy that the moment was at hand for the most important single speech of his presidency — a speech in which, after years of tension, he should take the leap to extend an olive branch to the Soviets.
This speech, delivered on June 10, 1963, at the American University commencement, asked Americans to re-examine their negative attitudes towards the Soviet Union and toward peace in general. “Too many of us think [peace] is impossible,” Kennedy said. “But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable.”
He urged Americans to “focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace,” rather than on a “grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers.” He asked the American people “not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.”
Although this American University address is now regarded as one of Kennedy’s most famous speeches, at the time his critics attacked this peaceful diplomatic overture to the Soviet Union as “a soft line that will accomplish nothing” and “a dreadful mistake.” Kennedy could have bowed to the pressure of these critics, but instead he chose to break from the aggressive and intransigent rhetoric of the past and redefine the debate.
The speech provided the show of good faith that Khrushchev was waiting for. As a result, despite years of political deadlock, a treaty to ban the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons was signed between the two nations less than two months later.
Today, we find ourselves at a similar impasse, opening the door to a wider military confrontation. Military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities have done nothing more than buy some time. The question is, what do we do with that time? If unilateral military attacks are going to erupt every time a government leader thinks an unfriendly country is developing nuclear weapons, we are entering a very dangerous future, indeed.
Fortunately, history has shown us that, in a moment defined by the overwhelming tensions that nuclear weapons create, sometimes the most powerful weapon of all is the strength of international dialogue and agreement.
Dr. Allen Pietrobon is the Chair of the Global Affairs department at Trinity Washington University and author of the book, Norman Cousins: Peacemaker in the Atomic Age (Johns Hopkins University Press).
This article was sent to peacevoiceeditors on June 29, 2025 by Tom Hastings on behalf of Dr. Allen Pietrobon.