By Mel Gurtov
Iran’s Problem-filled Situation
Taking advantage of another’s troubles: That’s the danger Iran faces from the next US administration. Iran’s domestic and international positions have seriously weakened, inviting Donald Trump to pounce.
For Iran, weakness invites either of two international directions. One is pursuit of negotiations with a stronger adversary, so as to buy time and save resources to devote to domestic problems. The other is to seek a “winning weapon” that will deter the adversary and unite the citizenry. Iran is at a decision point where it must make a critical decision on which direction to take.
The Trump administration waits in the wings. It is populated with hawkish advisers who, like those in Trump’s first term, are inclined to use coercive means against Iran, at a minimum to get it to stop enriching uranium to bomb level and at a maximum to seek regime change.
Iran’s policy choices must take into account the sources of its sudden weaknesses. One is its economy. Iran’s govt has had to take power plants off line in the midst of an unprecedented energy emergency. Industries throughout the country have had to shut down for the year, causing losses estimated in the tens of billions of dollars. Schools, government offices, banks, and other structures are getting electricity only sporadically. Internet service is unpredictable. Iran’s currency, the rial, is in freefall and the country is in darkness. Only residential areas have gas.
All this because of poor infrastructure, wasteful consumption, sanctions, mismanagement, and Israeli attacks on gas pipelines. How long the Iranian public will be quiet as the economy goes south remains to be seen.
For Iran, this crisis comes atop others. Its ally in Syria is gone, leaving in its place an Islamist regime likely to be unfriendly toward Iran. Syria’s collapse means a weakened Hezbollah, which until now had relied on a friendly Syria to allow weapons shipments to Hezbollah’s forces in Lebanon.
Hezbollah is demanding that the IDF complete its withdrawal from Lebanon in accordance with their 60-day cease-fire agreement last November. That agreement has now expired, and Israel’s withdrawal looks like it will be delayed—another outcome that might lead to another Iran-Israel confrontation.
The Nuclear Issue
In Israel, right-wing politicians close to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are publicly calling for direct attacks on Iran to eliminate its nuclear program before it advances further—and before Iran repairs its air defenses, which were badly battered by Israel’s attack on October 26. Making matters worse, the Israeli right has an incoming US president who is likely to support Israeli military operations beyond its borders, even including a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran’s leaders have to consider that they won’t get much if any help from Russia or China should Iran be attacked.
Might Iran attempt a nuclear breakout that would give it a deterrent against Israel? Or should Iran make clear to the world, as it has in the past, that it has no intention to build a nuclear arsenal, thus providing no pretext for a preemptive strike by Israel?
News reports indicate that Iran has proponents on both sides of the issue. A breakout is certainly possible; the only question is how soon. “Some nuclear experts argue it would take Iran anywhere between several months to up to a year. But China’s experience shows that Tehran could build a bomb much faster—in as little as three to five weeks.” Either way, it’s a choice neither the US nor Israel should want to force Iran to make.
Trump’s Options
The Trump administration ought to consider ways short of military options to deal with Iran. The Israel-Hamas cease-fire deal should help. Trump has the leverage with both Iran and Israel to make a deal that keeps Iran from going nuclear and avoids another major Middle East war.
The leverage with Iran is sanctions, which have added to Tehran’s economic woes. Iran can put on the table the drones and missiles it has been sending to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine. A reduction of both the sanctions and Iran’s military aid to Russia could constitute the basis for a US-Iran agreement that would lead to Iran’s halt of uranium enrichment and Israel’s backing off on attack plans.
Trump, however, may find that a negotiated solution to the current situation is not as attractive as a “win,” meaning support for an Israeli strike that sets back Iran’s nuclear program by years. But he should recall that his previous tough policy toward Iran failed.
After Trump pulled the US out of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran in May 2018 and imposed heavy sanctions, Iran did not fold. To the contrary, it accelerated its nuclear bomb-making program, though stopping short of 90-percent enrichment that is necessary to produce a weapon. Iran has also relocated its nuclear weapons program to deep inside a mountain. Attacking that site would be unlikely to destroy it completely.
Will Trump nevertheless conclude that Iran this time around is too weak and too vulnerable to worry about its response? Will he decide that a negotiated agreement looks too much like the deal Obama concluded, and spitefully reject that option?
Odds are that Trump will opt for increasing military and economic pressure on Iran as a first step. If that pressure doesn’t lead to a clear concession from Iran on its nuclear activities, the chances are slim that Trump will engage in prolonged negotiations with Iran. If he pursues further coercive measures, Iran’s grievances against the US and Israel will last another generation, Iran’s people will suffer, and Iran will be more likely to build a nuclear weapon arsenal once it recovers.
Reflecting on those long-term consequences should lead to a US policy based on win-win diplomacy rather than one based on zero-sum confrontation.
Mel Gurtov, syndicated by PeaceVoice, is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Portland State University and blogs at In the Human Interest.
This article was sent on January 25, 2025 to peacevoice editors by Tom Hastings on behalf of Mel Gurtov.