By Stephen Kinzer
National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster and White House
chief of staff John Kelly watched a presidential appearance
alongside Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Vice President
Mike Pence in August. (photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
In a democracy, no one should be comforted to hear that generals have imposed discipline on an elected head of state. That was never supposed to happen in the United States. Now it has.
Among the most enduring political images of the 20th century was the military junta. It was a group of grim-faced officers â€” usually three â€” who rose to control a state. The junta would tolerate civilian institutions that agreed to remain subservient, but in the end enforced its own will. As recently as a few decades ago, military juntas ruled important countries including Chile, Argentina, Turkey, and Greece.
These days the junta system is making a comeback in, of all places, Washington. Ultimate power to shape American foreign and security policy has fallen into the hands of three military men: General James Mattis, the secretary of defense; General John Kelly, President Trumpâ€™s chief of staff; and General H.R. McMaster, the national security adviser. They do not put on their ribbons to review military parades or dispatch death squads to kill opponents, as members of old-style juntas did. Yet their emergence reflects a new stage in the erosion of our political norms and the militarization of our foreign policy. Another veil is dropping.
Given the presidentâ€™s ignorance of world affairs, the emergence of a military junta in Washington may seem like welcome relief. After all, its three members are mature adults with global experience â€” unlike Trump and some of the wacky political operatives who surrounded him when he moved into the White House. Already they have exerted a stabilizing influence. Mattis refuses to join the rush to bomb North Korea, Kelly has imposed a measure of order on the White House staff, and McMaster pointedly distanced himself from Trumpâ€™s praise for white nationalists after the violence in Charlottesville.
Being ruled by generals seems preferable to the alternative. It isnâ€™t.
Trained to Fight Wars
Military officers, like all of us, are products of their background and environment. The three members of Trumpâ€™s junta have 119 years of uniformed service between them. They naturally see the world from a military perspective and conceive military solutions to its problems. That leads toward a distorted set of national priorities, with military â€œneedsâ€ always rated more important than domestic ones.
Trump has made clear that when he must make foreign policy choices, he will defer to â€œmy generals.â€ Mattis, the new juntaâ€™s strongman, is the former head of Central Command, which directs American wars in the Middle East and Central Asia. Kelly is also an Iraq veteran. McMaster has commanded troops in Iraq and Afghanistan almost without interruption since he led a tank company in the 1991 Gulf War.
Military commanders are trained to fight wars, not to decide whether fighting makes strategic sense. They may be able to tell Trump how many troops are necessary to sustain our present mission in Afghanistan, for example, but they are not trained either to ask or answer the larger question of whether the mission serves Americaâ€™s long-term interest. That is properly the job of diplomats. Unlike soldiers, whose job is to kill people and break things, diplomats are trained to negotiate, defuse conflicts, coolly assess national interest and design policies to advance it. Notwithstanding Mattisâ€™s relative restraint on North Korea, all three members of Trumpâ€™s junta promote the confrontational approach that has brought protracted war in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond, while fueling tension in Europe and East Asia.
Our New Junta’s Differences from Classic Ones
Our new junta is different from classic ones like, for example, the â€œNational Council for Peace and Orderâ€ that now rules Thailand. First, our juntaâ€™s interest is only international relations, not domestic policy. Second, it did not seize power in a coup, but derives its authority from the favor of an elected president. Third and most important, it main goal is not to impose a new order but to enforce an old one.
Last month, President Trump faced a crucial decision about the future of Americaâ€™s war in Afghanistan. This was a potential turning point. Four years agoÂ Trump tweeted, â€œLetâ€™s get out of Afghanistan.â€ If he had followed that impulse and announced that he was bringing American troops home, the political and military elite in Washington would have been stunned. But junta members swung into action. They persuaded Trump to announce that instead of withdrawing, he would do the opposite: reject â€œrapid exitâ€ from Afghanistan, increase troop strength, and continue â€œkilling terrorists.â€
It is no great surprise that Trump has been drawn into the foreign policy mainstream; the same happened to President Obama early in his presidency. More ominous is that Trump has turned much of his power over to generals. Worst of all, many Americans find this reassuring. They are so disgusted by the corruption and shortsightedness of our political class that they turn to soldiers as an alternative. It is a dangerous temptation.Î¦
Stephen Kinzer is an award-winning author and foreign correspondent who has covered more than 50 countries on five continents. His articles and books have led the Washington Post to place him â€œamong the best in popular foreign policy storytelling.â€ He was Latin America correspondent for The Boston Globe, and then spent more than 20 years working for the New York Times, with extended postings in Nicaragua, Germany, and Turkey. He is a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. His most recent book is The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War. He wrote this article for the Boston Globe. It was published there on September 16.